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Introduction
For the past decades or so China has been recording
spectacular economic growth as it has implemented a wideranging transformation of its economic system. China has
moved from a closed centrally-planned economy to become one
of the world’s major trading nations and the largest recipient of
foreign investment. However, these dramatic economic changes
have brought with them changes in the social and political
perceptions, values and aspirations of the Chinese people. The
challenge for the Chinese leadership is to manage the various
competing demands and chart a balanced mode of development
and modernization.
The new Chinese leadership, encapsulated in Hu Jintao,
who became Party Secretary-General in November 2002 and
State President in March 2003, and Wen Jiabao, who became
Premier in March 2003, has stressed the elements of continuity
with the past, but at the same time has begun to slowly establish
a more populist style of governance. The SARS outbreak was an
early test of the new leaders’ mettle from which they emerged
with some credit, but other challenges have also had to be faced:
rising concern over corruption, the war in Iraq and its aftermath,
heightened rhetoric as Taiwanese presidential elections come
closer, and international pressures for currency revaluation.
In late September 2003, the Centre for Asian Pacific
Studies hosted a Workshop on ‘China under the New
Leadership’ to examine some of the challenges that the Hu-Wen
1

leadership faces and assess their record to date. The participants
and presenters drawn from academia, the media, the diplomatic
community and the business world joined in discussions which
ranged widely over domestic politics, foreign policy, economic
policy and social issues. Included in this Working Paper are two
of the presentations, which have been up-dated and revised; they
are printed in the original language of presentation. Dr Ma Yue,
from Lingnan University’s Department of Economics, examines
the implications of China’s entry into the World Trade
Organisation, while Wang Ping, the Deputy Editor-in-Chief
with China Review, discusses the impact of the development of
the private sector on China’s economy.
In conclusion, I would like to thank Dr Wong Yiu-chung,
of Lingnan University’s Department of Politics and Sociology,
for conceiving and planning this Workshop.

Brian Bridges
Associate Director of CAPS
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The Impact of China's Accession to the WTO*
઼̚ˢ͵ܐ۞ޢՎड़ᑕ̶ژ
Yue Ma ()+

ၡ!
ώ͛Аኢ઼̚ˢ͵݈۞˘ֱᇎᇋĎܐޢՎ̶ژ
઼̚ˢ͵۞ޢड़ᑕ̈́༊݈ˠϔ။̿ࣃ۞ۋኢĄԧࣇ۞ඕኢ
ߏൺഇ̰ˠϔ။ᑕྍܲᘦؠĄҭֽ୧ІјሢޢĎˠϔ
။ᑕѣዋ༊۞ঙજቑಛĎͽዋᑕ઼̰γགྷᑻ୧І۞ត̼Ą
ֱ୧ІΒ߁གྷᑻޘטԼࢭ۞ซ˘ՎԆචĎͽᑕ;઼̚ˢ
͵߄۞ޢጼĄ
Abstract
This paper will first review the early concerns about
China's entry to the WTO. Then we will evaluate the preliminary
impact of the WTO membership on the Chinese economy, which
turned out to be better than expected. We also discuss the
current international debate on the Chinese currency renminbi
revaluation and suggest that a gradual improvement of the
current Chinese rigid exchange rate system will be inevitable.
*

Paper prepared for the Workshop on China under New Leadership
which was held on 30 September 2003 and organized by the Centre for
Asian Pacific Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong. I would like to
thank Dr Y C Wong to invite me to present this paper in the Workshop
and Professor Barton Starr and other workshop participants for their
useful comments on an early draft of this paper.
+
Associate Professor in Economics, Dept of Economics, Lingnan University,
Tuen Mun, Hong Kong. Fax: + (852) 2891 7940; Tel (852) 2616 7202; Email:
yuema@Ln.edu.hk. Internet: http://www.Ln.edu.hk/econ/staff/yuema
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Finally we will explore the potential problems and challenges to
both economies of mainland China and Hong Kong in the future.
We argue that international competitions apparently are
competitions among quality of goods and services, technological
software and hardware. In fact, it is competitions among the
institutions. As only the better institutions may attract more
resources internationally including both physical capital and
human capital. China's determination to enter the WTO after 15
years of long negotiations is as significant as her initial reform
from the central planned economy towards a market economy. It
signifies that China will reform her traditional market economy
towards an internationally competitive market for the 21st
century's New Economy. Furthermore, Without doubt, facing
such unprecedented challenges both from mainland China and
new world economy, Hong Kong must reform her political and
economic institutions to foster a new economic partnership with
mainland China to sustain her high income and high growth
rate in the future.

In this paper I'll first review the early concerns about
China's entry to the WTO. Then I will evaluate the preliminary
impact of the WTO membership on the Chinese economy.
Finally I will discuss the potential problems and challenges to
both economies of mainland China and Hong Kong in the future.
At the time when China joined the WTO, the main
concerns were focused on her agricultural. The Chinese
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agricultural sector has been fully-protected by the government's
high tariff policy in the past.
The productivity of Chinese agricultural sector is low and
its international competitiveness is weak. The concessions that
the Chinese government made in the WTO agreement was
believed to be detrimental to the agricultural sector. Given the
fact that the Chinese agricultural population is about 60-70% of
the total population, the negative impact on the agricultural
sector might spill over to other sectors and might create social
unrest that would disruptive to national economy as a whole.
Another

major

concern

at

that

time

was

the

competitiveness of domestic industrial sector. It turned out that
in January and March 2003, one year after China joined the
WTO, the Chinese trade balances went into deficits at the first
time after consecutive seven years of surplus since 1994 (cf.
Table 1). People started to concern about the stability of the
Chinese currency renminbi as well.
Furthermore, with the intensified competition from foreign
enterprises, the banking sector’s bad debt problem becomes only
more difficult and takes more time to resolve (Zhao, et al, 2002).
The picture of the WTO membership was unclear. There was
even suggestion for China to withdraw from the WTO!
Today, after more than one year WTO membership, the
initial impact, however, does not seem to be severe. In fact, the
economy is better than people expected.

5

The GDP growth rate in year 2002 was 8%. Despite the
SARS, the GDP growth rates at the 1st and 2nd quarters in 2003
were 9.9% and 8.2%, respectively (cf. Table 2). All are high
than 7.3% in year 2001 before China joined the WTO.
The agricultural sector survived well with growth rate of
2.9% in 2002 and average growth rate of 3.1% in the 1st half of
2003. All are higher than the 2.8% growth rate in 2001 before
the entry to the WTO.
The exports of the agricultural products have been actually
increased, thanks to the unexpected rise of international price of
agricultural products during 2002. The imports of agricultural
products have been constrained because of the slow reduction of
tariffs along the WTO agreement and the fact that the import
agents are restricted to be only the state-owned trading
companies.
For the Chinese economy as a whole, overall trading
surplus reemerged as well after the temporary trade deficits in
the early 2003. At the first time, the China’s trade surplus
against US is larger than the Japan’s trade surplus against US.
Also at the same time, foreign direct investment surged and
China has taken over the US to become the largest recipient
country of FDI in the world in 2002. The beneficial effects of
FDI on the Chinese economy are well-documented (Tsang and
Ma, 1997).
The trade surplus together with a large inflow of FDI is
good news for China. However, every coin has its two sides.
International pressure on the renminbi revaluation has been
6

increasing. Ironically, this time the pressure is not from
speculators but from politicians of Chinese major trading
partners in US, Europe, and Asia. China has been subject to
repeated criticisms from her trading partners recently on her
fixed exchange rate policy. An economic problem has turned
into a political dispute. How to resolve this dispute has become
an urgent research topic.
Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to this problem. Let
me just spell out some aspects of he complexity of this issue
without getting too much details due to time constraint. The
reform of the Chinese exchange rate system is related to the
sequence of the Chinese capital account liberalization and the
process of full convertibility of the renminbi (Liu, et al, 2002). It
is also related to the problem of bad debt problem of the Chinese
banking sector. More importantly, it is related to the impact on
the economy here in Hong Kong, especially on the stability of
the Hong Kong dollar since the China factor on the economy of
Hong Kong is prominent (Ma, et al, 1998).
Internationally, an unstable renminbi and the consequential
economic slow down in China would also generate negative
impacts on the world economy, especially on the US and other
Asian regional economies (Tsang and Ma, 2002). Furthermore,
a large sale of US government bonds by the Chinese
government at the eve before a large reevaluation of renminbi
would increase the market interest rates in the US. This clearly
is not the consequence the US government would like to see. In
fact, the Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in
China pointed out that one of the major beneficiaries of the
7

stable renminbi is the US multinationals invested in China and
the US domestic consumers who enjoyed the cheap Chinese
goods (Kynge, 2003).
However, on the other hand, a rigid, non-market
determined exchange rate system is also no good for the Chinese
economy in the long run. This is especially true when the
domestic market of China will have been built up and is big and
strong enough to buffer international shocks on the renminbi.
Therefore, on the balance, we would expect that another
well-accepted gradual reform on the renminbi system in the near
future is inevitable, both to release the international political
pressure and to improve the exchange rate system itself. In
addition, it is like to inject a vaccine into the Chinese trading
sector, the industrial sector, the banking sector, and the Chinese
individuals to enhance their ability to cope with the future fullscale fluctuations of renminbi (Ma, 2003).
Looking into the future, China's entry to the WTO is a
challenge to the economy and institutions in Hong Kong as well.
International competitions apparently are competitions among
the quality of goods and services, technological software and
hardware. In fact, it is competitions among the institutions. As
only the better institutions may attract more resources
internationally including both physical capital and human
capital.
China's determination to enter the WTO after 15 years of
long negotiations is as significant as her initial reform from the
central planned economy towards a market economy (Ma, 2001).
8

It signifies that China will reform her traditional market
economy towards an internationally competitive market for the
21st century's New Economy.
Furthermore, China has also started her reform of
government structures. For example, more than 2,300 legal and
regulations have been abolished or have been replaced by the
new ones to comply with the WTO accession agreement. Indeed,
in the testimony before the U.S. Trade Representative in
Washington, D.C., in August 2002, the Chairman of the
American Chamber of Commerce in China commented, "In our
view, the Chinese government is demonstrating a serious
commitment to meeting its WTO obligations."
However, skepticism about China's willingness to keep its
WTO promises has increased since then. Only 20 percent of
companies, responding to a survey of the American Chamber of
Commerce in China and the American Chamber of Commerce
in Shanghai, said Beijing is "willing, able and prepared to
implement changes in the spirit of the WTO agreement"
(McDonald, 2003). At the other extreme, 30 percent of
respondents thought China was willing to follow only the letter
of WTO commitments or is looking for ways to avoid making
changes.
On the positive side, four out of five businesses surveyed
said their revenues in China rose last year, while 75 percent said
they were profitable, the report said. Nevertheless, it says, China
has to show that it is responsive to rising foreign concern about
its compliance with WTO commitments.
9

It is also interesting to point out the recent shift of the
regional distribution of the FDI within China. Just after a few
months after China entered the WTO, the share of FDI in
Yangtze River Delta around Shanghai has surpassed the Pearl
River Delta in Guangdong. The regional competition for
resources is intensive (Li and Ma, 1996). Most of these new FDI
to Shanghai are hi-tech or knowledge-based industries rather
than those labour intensive, traditional ones in the Guangdong
province. If this trend continues, the relative importance of Pearl
River Delta would decline and her neighbour Hong Kong would
be affected as well.
Without doubt, facing such unprecedented challenges both
from mainland China and new world economy, Hong Kong
must reform her political and economic institutions to foster a
new economic partnership with mainland China to sustain her
high income and high growth rate in the future.
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Table 1. China’s Monthly Export and Import (in 100 mil. US$)
Date
1994
1995
1996
1997

Export
1210.1
1487.8
1510.5
1827.9

Import
1156.2
1320.8
1388.3
1423.7

1998
1999
2000
2001

1837.1
1949.3
2492.0
2661.0

1402.4
1657.0
2250.9
2435.5

2002.01
2002.02
2002.03

217.0
191.4
238.3

189.8
159.1
224.4

2002.04
2002.05
2002.06

267.3
246.4
260.1

257.5
224.4
230.9

2002.07
2002.08
2002.09

292.1
294.4
319.0

269.9
272.1
297.8

2002.10
2002.11
2002.12

299.4
312.1
318.9

251.9
287.3
287.3

2003.01
2003.02
2003.03

298.2
245.0
320.8

310.2
237.6
325.1

2003.04
2003.05
2003.06

356.0
338.3
344.8

345.9
316.1
323.4

2003.07

381.1

365.1

Source: China’s Customs Statistical Office (ঔᙯᓁཌტЪΦ)
Website: http://www.customs.gov.cn/tongjishujv/Book1.files/sheet003.htm
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Table 2. China’s Economic Annual Growth Rates (%)
Date
1990
1991
1992
1993

GDP Agriculture Industry Service
3.8
7.3
3.2
2.3
9.2
2.4
13.9
8.8
14.2
4.7
21.2
12.4
13.5
4.7
19.9
10.7

1994
1995
1996
1997

12.6
10.5
9.6
8.8

4.0
5.0
5.1
3.5

18.4
13.9
12.1
10.5

9.6
8.4
7.9
9.1

1998
1999
2000
2001

7.8
7.1
8.0
7.3

3.5
2.8
2.4
2.8

8.9
8.1
9.4
8.7

8.3
7.7
8.1
7.4

2002

8.0

2.9

9.9

7.3

2003Q1
2003Q2

9.9
8.2

3.5
2.7

12.3
11.6

7.6
4.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook of China.
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Chinese Private Enterprises
ռᒉགྷᑻůů઼̚߆གྷࢲШᇾ
Wang Ping (ͳπ)

Abstract
The paper argues that the development of the private sector
has, in fact, become the indicator of China’s national economy.
A norm could be derived from the economic development during
the reform and open era in the past two decades: the fewer
restrictions imposed by the state, the faster is the economy
development of China. Furthermore, the paper argues that there
is a close relationship between economic modernization and
traditional cultural traits which are based on Confucian clanfamilial network. The paper believes that these traits would
become powerful facilitators in China’s modernization drive.

઼̂̚ౙ۞གྷᑻ൴णೀѐࠎ͵ࠧ៘ϫĂߏ̂ݭགྷᑻ
វ㝯ࢬјಶࠎܪᚊ۞ĄΝѐ̂ౙ۞ GDP ̏གྷ྿זȈ༱ᆆ
പ။Ă̫ѐᔵ”ܧ“זצᇆᜩĂҭߏᓁវ˯࿅Νѐᑕྍ
ߏ՟ѣયᗟ۞Ą
઼̂̚ౙགྷᑻ۞൴णᄃռᒉགྷᑻ۞ుՎᎸĂႷߏ
̷࠹ᙯ۞ć઼҃छ၆ٺռᒉགྷᑻ۞ၗޘĂ၆ٺξಞགྷᑻ
д̂ౙ۞߆ڼᄮТăҋҋϤޥຐ۞ؠۺѣᇾຍཌྷĄ
ЯѩĂԧࣇΞͽ࿅៍၅ռᒉགྷᑻ࿅Ν˟Ȉѐ۞ශ܂ăѡ
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Զ൴णăుՎᎸĂֽࡁտ઼̂̚ౙ߆ڼགྷᑻ۞តࢭ࿅
Ą
གྷᑻࢲШᇾ!
д˟˟ѐĂ઼ܧѣགྷᑻ۞யࣃࡗҫ GDP Њᗝ۞ˬ
̶̝˟Ă̚ৌϒϤռᒉЋຽԆј۞Њᗝд˟̶̝˘ͽ
˯Ąϫ઼݈̚дᄦౄຽ㝯ࢬĂѣ˘Ѻкயݡፂࠧ͵ٺௐ
˘Ăͧтෛ፟ăДቐăDVDăگᚤăᇝћ֘ඈĄ
˘ؠຍཌྷ˯ᄲĂ઼̚ռᒉགྷᑻ̏གྷјࠎ̂ౙགྷᑻᜈ
൴ण۞જ˧Ąᄃ઼ѣЋຽăˬྤЋຽăγથྤ࠹
ͧĂֱѐјܜԣ۞ᔘߏώ˿۞ݭռᒉЋຽĄ
ԧࣇ̂छౌܧ૱ሢଉ۞̂ౙᄬ֏ಶߏ“Լࢭฟ”ٸĂѣ៍
ᕇᄮࠎԼࢭߏ၆̰۞Ăฟٸߏ၆γ۞Ą၁ԧࣇ
а࿅ᐝֽ࠻Ăҋ˛ȈѐϐˣȈѐܐฟؕĂ઼̂̚ౙ၆
ٺռᒉགྷᑻ˵ߏଳ“פుՎٸฟ”۞͞ёĂࡇߏѝഇϤڼ߆ٺ
Ϡၗטࢨ۞ه៍ົۤĂՎᆹܧ૱ᓞᙱĄ
ᐌξಞ˧ณૻ̼ĂপҾξಞ߱͘۞ᇃྻھϡĂռᒉ
གྷᑻ۞၁˧֝ిᕖૺĂֹϔᒉЋຽ̏གྷు႙ѣਕ˧·Ї
ͽـϤ઼छଠ۞טኜкҖຽĄᙯ઼̂̚ڦౙགྷᑻ۞ˠ̀ົ
൴னĂ઼ᒉЋຽ۞ய̏ݡགྷଂ˟Ȉѐ݈۞Βᘲ༱ѣĂᒺഴ
ࡇזѣֱ֤၆઼ٺछ۞߆ڼщБăְщБăགྷᑻщБă
ᒖဩщБѣՙّؠຍཌྷ۞ᅳાĂͧт̍Ћຽăਝ͇ਝ
۩Ąᐌξಞགྷᑻវ۞טซ˘ՎԆචĂܛᏉăੈăਕ
ඈͽـᚑॾࢨטռᒉགྷᑻΒ߁γ઼ྤώซˢ۞ᅳાĂனд
̏གྷుՎ“ฟ”ٸĄ
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Ϥ઼̂̚ٺౙ߆عѣຍဦгଯજ઼ੜϔซĂϏֽռᒉ
Ћຽд઼̚གྷᑻ̚۞гҜົซ˘Վז೩̿Ą
ᓁඕ࿅Ν˟Ȉкѐ઼̂̚ౙ۞གྷᑻ൴णĂΞͽᄲĂ༊
ռᒉགྷᑻ൴णͧྵึӀ۞ॡĂՏ༊઼छ၆ռᒉགྷᑻ۞ࡗ
Ձͧྵᆵᗫ۞ॡĂ̂ߏ˵ــౙགྷᑻ൴णͧྵԣ۞ॡ
ഇĂЯࠎล߱ــҡᐌҖ߆̒۞ࢫҲăν้ຍᙊ
ԛၗᇆᜩ۞˭ࢫĄЯѩΞͽᄲռᒉЋຽѣགྷᑻࢲШᇾ۞
үϡĄ
઼̚ռᒉЋຽ̏ҫ઼̚གྷᑻΗጨѯ̋Ăགྷᑻ˧ณ̏གྷ
ు႙ؼҩڼ߆זᅳાĂҭߏ็צ۞ᇆᜩĂռᒉЋຽ̬
ˢ߆ڼĂϫ݈۞ૄώΑਕᔘߏ“ࡓથˠ”Ą҃ଂҹ“ޥགྷ
ᑻૄᖂՙ˯ؠᆸޙ”ֽ࠻Ă઼̚۞ࡓથˠ၆ٺᝋ˧۞ᇆ
ᜩົດֽດ̂ĄȈ̱̂ѣ˘ֱռᒉЋຽछтቼᐁૈăՔ
͛ၷඈЇБ઼ᛨܑĂѣˠᄮࠎȈ˛̂۞ॡົѣռᒉ
ЋຽछᒔᏴ̚δ؎ࣶĄ
ଂԈ៍˯࠻Ă߆ڼགྷᑻߏᙱͽ̶छ۞Ăдߙֱॡ
Ăགྷᑻјܜώ֗ಶߏે߆۰ࢦ۞߆ྤڼώć҃дޝ
кॡĂ߆ڼᄃགྷᑻ۞։ّ̢જĂ˜ߏགྷᑻπᘦԣి൴ण
۞ࢦ୧ІĄ༊ѐ̂ౙщᑔ࠷ᆂวгડ˵ಶߏ͉ځয়Ѧ̮
ራ۞ҁछ۞ೀ͗ྺϔĂಶߏϡϲ“ϠѪ͛३”۞ԛёĂֽએ
એг၁ҖΒய͗זࣧؕ۞ϠயЪү͞ё۞Ą͞ё
дࢶപˠீ̚ᖎۡߏ͇གྷгཌྷ۞རޢϠய͞ёĂҭߏд༊
ॡ۞઼̂̚ౙĂҖࠎࢬ၆۞߆ࢲڼᐍߏλ̂Ăᐌॡົ
ගࣇ۞ϠౄјխᙱĄ˵ϒߏ።Ϋ۞ᒖဩЯ৵Ăֹ
ֱྺϔдϠхώਕ۞ᜭֹ˭ү۞གྷᑻҖࠎĂ၆̚
઼ۤົٙѣ۞ܜᅈ߆ڼຍཌྷĂ၆̙Ҳٺன၁۞གྷᑻ
ຍཌྷĄ
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ЯѩĂԧତ˭ֽಶଂռᒉЋຽ߆ڼгҜ۞តֽ̼ҥ
ᙋռᒉЋຽүࠎ઼̚߆གྷࢲШᇾ۞ҿᕝĄ
߆ࢲڼШᇾ!
̂छౌۢĂ̂ౙЩᇆᜩᆒፍᇉдȈ̱݈̂Яࠎએ
ඁ႒ඁజԹĂдБ઼кг͞۞ࡗ˟ȈٗயజٮĄ
ҭߏ˫ܕజ˞ٸֽĄҭߏІְଐ۞ᇆᜩᔘдٺȈ̱
݈̂ѣᙯಱˠੑಱֽયᗟۋኢĄ༊ॡˬܑଯĂѣ
៍ᕇᄮࠎΞͽឰռᒉЋຽछˢᛨĂ˵ѣˠિՙͅ၆Ą
ࠎࠤᆃ“ˬܑ”ռᒉЋຽछˢᛨົд઼̂̚ౙ͔
ᇃ۞ھኢĂҌ̫ᔘۋኢ̙Ѓĉ
дࢶപ۞̂ܜѐᅅ˘ĂΞਕ၆Вயᛨ۞ᄮᙊҬߏ҃
ܧĂࠤҌϤٺಫវ۞ቡ߇҃၆ВயᛨѣӼᜲ̼۞ᄮᙊĄ
˘ࢶപ۞̚ϠഅགྷયԧĈ“ߏ̙ߏࡇѣВய઼छ۞ˠ̖
Ыۓĉ”Ăԧ༊ॡࣵ৯̙ĂΪрયᔹ઼ߏ̙ߏВய઼
छĉᄲ̙ߏćԧᄲĂ͵ࠧ˯ಙ҇ۓЩ۞၆̙ߏ̚
઼ˠĂ҃ߏᔹ઼ˠĄ
̳π҃ኢĂ઼̂̚ౙᐹս۞ˠ̖Ăѣߏ̶ొ̂ޝΐ
ˢ˞઼̚Вயᛨ۞ĄЯࠎ˘ૄώ۞Я৵ಶߏĂтڍҰ՟
ѣਕ˧Ă՟ѣр۞ཏிૄᖂĂߏͧྵᙱͽ࿅͚ొෞᛉ
˘ᙯ۞Ą˵ϒߏЯࠎВயᛨጾѣ߆ྤڼ֭ะ̚˞̂Բᐹ
սˠ̖Ăд̂ౙۤົѣૻ̂۞ᇆᜩ˧Ă̖ѣռᒉЋຽ
ԓ୕ΐˢ઼̚ВயᛨĄ
ᔵԧࣇଂޝкಫវ˯࠻̂זౙޝкలߏౌءВயᛨ
ࣶĂҭߏԧࣇ˵ᑕྍ࠻זĂலౣ઼̚Вயᛨम̙кѣ˛˼
༱ᛨࣶĂͷ“̖̙֖ͽᑻೋ”Ă˘͞ࢬֱల͌ߏࡇءᇴच
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ཏ̝ĂΩ˘͞ࢬᄲځВயᛨᔘߏࢦڦӛৼˠ̖۞ć҃
ֱలءĂ˵֭˘ܧฟؕಶߏᗼˠĂӎޝ˵ࣇᙱѣ፟ົ
జॢ̿۞ޝזҜཉĄ
ҭߏĂଂВயᛨ۞ّኳֽᄲߏঐໝࣤ݇ล৺
۞Ă҃ռᒉЋຽಶߏ็ؠཌྷ˭۞݇ࣤ۞ݭล৺Ą֤
ᆃĂ˘ཏҋ̎ঐໝ۞ˠӛৼזҋ̎۞ੱᒉ㝯ࢬ
ֽĂ֭ͷཏវܧ૱Ξਕ࿅ԼតВயᛨ۞፟វĂซ҃
ԼតВயᛨ۞ّኳĂߏ̙ЪទᏭ۞Ą֤ᆃĂϯࠤ
ᆃĉ
၁Ă઼̚Вயᛨଂֽಶ̙ߏ̙Զ̙љ۞݈ᛂᓑё۞
ВயᛨĂ።Ϋ˵ᙋ̙ځਕԆБВய઼ᅫ۞ϯд઼̚
ซҖࢭĄ༊ѐ̙̂˵ڒᄮࠎͨ፨ߏڌৌϒ۞οႬ̦ჯ
ҹĂٙͽࣇ̝ม۞ᙯܼົଂତצጱăஎ̼Ϭ࠼ז
ՙෘĄ઼̚ВயᛨјΑ۞ᙯᔣд઼̼̚ٺĂ˵ಶߏֽޢٙ
ᄲ۞“઼֕̚ё۞ۤົཌྷྮ”Ą
ҹ۞ޥЩኢᕝಶߏགྷᑻૄᖂՙ˯ؠᆸޙĂ༊̂
ౙుՎٸฟኜкᅳાឰռᒉགྷᑻซˢ̝ޢĂᐌξಞགྷᑻ
៍۞هஎˢˠ͕Ă၆˯ᆸޙ۞ឭࢴಶυߏΞᔖҺ۞
˞Ąռᒉགྷᑻ൴णؠ˘ז۞ޘॡĂপҾߏт̫̏གྷҫ
ѣ઼̚གྷᑻΗጨѯ̋۞ॡĂڼ߆෦ՐυົుՎ೩
̿ĂԼត˯ᆸޙ۞୬୕˵ಶົֽૻধгܑன
ֽĄ҃ͷĂүࠎ˘၆Бۤົᇆᜩֽ̂۞གྷᑻཏវĂ
Їңે߆۞˧ณౌ̙Ξਕنෛࣇ۞хдĂࣇᚶᜈ༊
үঐໝ۞၆෪ளٺගҋ̎ᄦౄ̂ณ۞֖ͽᕘใѣड़გ
۞ົ઼ۤ̚ڼᇲˠĂυົజ͟ৈӴ̂۞ཏវٙ
ஂ՟Ą
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̯ధռᒉགྷᑻ൴ण̝ٙͽՎᆹᓞᙱĂ၁дߏ̚ঘ
͉זк۞߆ۋڼĄࠤҌΞͽᄲĂ˟Ȉкѐֽռᒉགྷᑻ۞
൴णĂߏ࿅ᜈ۞ᄃ઼̂̚ౙν้ޥຐֽ၁ன۞Ą
̯ధռᒉЋຽछˢᛨĂڼ߆ຍཌྷߏλ̂۞Ă၆̚ٺ
઼̂ౙѣஎᅈ۞ۤົຍཌྷĄܜഇд઼̂̚ౙѣࢦү
ϡ۞ຍᙊԛၗࡎĂЯࠎ“ˬܑ”జ୶̼Ă ѣᙯล৺
၆ϲ۞ᓏࢰᙱͽ͔ᅳۤົĄтͽڍϒă็۞ؠཌྷă
Ȉѐ݈۞ீЍĂڱᄮᙊȈѐ઼̝̚۞ޢВயᛨĄ
҃ϤռᒉЋຽˢᛨ͔൴எᆸۤົតࢭ၆̚රϔ۞
ೇᎸѣࢦ̂ຍཌྷůụ̊Ȉѐ݈Ξͽભ՟ѣВயᛨಶ՟
ѣາ઼̚Ă༊઼̚Вயᛨဳ߆˞פᝋăᜭు˞γ઼д઼̚
۞തϔ๕˧̝ޢĂಶυืԆјଂࢭᛨ߆ેזᛨ۞ᖼೱć
҃ˬܑ۞೩Ăϒߏࠎᖼೱ೩ֻ˞நኢૄᖂĂֹ
ે߆ᛨ۞ϔிૄᖂᖬᄏፋۤົĂ̙҃ߏߙপؠล৺۞
֏ˠĄࠤҌᄲޝΞਕ࿅߆ᛨ۞̶ᜊĂ࿅ͧྵπ۞
͞ёၹޙϔ۞િ၁ૄᖂĄᇹĂ઼̂̚ౙ۞ϔΞਕ
ϤѩՎˢԣి൴णล߱Ą
ଂຍཌྷ˯ᄲĂϤٺགྷᑻᚥ҃ు႙ࠎۤົࢦޘ
ෛ۞ռᒉགྷᑻĂд߆ڼ൴णᔌШ͞ࢬ۞ᚥ˵ߏ΄ˠ
ޘᙯ۞ڦćཏវజ̯ధΐˢ઼̚ВயᛨĂүࠎ઼̚
̂ౙ߆ࢲڼШᇾ۞֎Ғ˵ߏ༊̝ປ۞Ą
ռᒉЋຽݎᎸᄃ็̼͛পኳ!
˘гડдߙֱ͞ࢬᒔᜈ൴णĂ˘ਠֽᄲౌѣ
̼͛পኳ۞͚ᇣĄࢶപߏԯঔᙝ۞г߱ౌϡֽᎸޙᆷ
фሁĂҭߏֽࣧ۞ܦफξ؎३ăֽޢЇޙనొܿ۞ܜϒ
ᓏĂܦफೀ˼Ѽр۞ঔᙝгޙј·႕̼͛ঈि۞ঔ
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ᑺܜುĄᄮࠎĂ˘ݱξтڍ՟ѣિ၁۞̼͛غᛃĂߏ
ᙱͽૈങҋ֗۞̰д൴णજ˧۞Ą
ԧࣇౌۢĂܕȈೀѐֽĂޝк൴ण઼̚छтТ઼̚
˘ᇹĂౌ᎕ໂШγྤ٢͘Ă҃ͷගγથ೩ֻ۞ᐹ୧Іޝ
кߏ࿅઼̚۞Ăҭߏࠎࠤᆃ઼̚གྷᑻ۞൴ण˘ڑսĉ
ੵ˞ώгξಞλ̂ă౻જ˧·ྈ̝γĂᔘѣࠤᆃᄃி̙Т
۞Я৵ĉ
ԧࣇΞͽଂ็࠻ְּֽ̼͛পኳ۞યᗟĄ˘
ߏέ៉̚රགྷᑻࡁտੰੰܜౘڑ౾̀ᄲĈ“̂ౙ೩ֻ˞ܧ
૱ຆᆊ۞౻જ˧Ă҃ͷߏܧ૱ѣड़த۞౻જ˧Ă˵ߏέ៉
ˠົგந۞౻જ˧Ăߏ઼छౌ՟ѣᏱڱგ֤ᆃ
р۞౻જ˧”ĄΩ˘ְּߏĂ͟ώ۞ࣧ˾ܷିдĮڌ
ֲགྷᑻგநį˘३̚ᄲĂ͟ώ઼̚זԸྤ۞̈̚ЋຽĂѣ
Ѻ̶̝αỊ̏זȈĂЯࠎԡ˞̙צЧ౫҃ၣྤćΩѣ
አߤពϯĂ͟ώЋຽࠁዸ઼̚۞ࣶ̍ĂѺ̶̝ˬȈкᄮࠎ
хд̼͛ࡦഀ۞ࡎĄ
ΩγĂ͟ώଂ઼̚ซ˾۞ྺயݡĂޝкֽҋ̂ౙ۞̋
ڌĄፂۢĂ͟ώд̋ڌԸྤྺຽயຽĂயݡ˾͟ώĂЋ
ຽଳϡ۞ߏ˘ܧ૱؈প۞ߛၹůů͟ώˠྤĂέ៉ˠ
გநĂϡ̂ౙ۞˿г౻̍ĄඕڍĂЋຽ࠹༊јΑĄ
ߏࠎࠤᆃĉ͟ώăᔹ઼ౌஎצጏछᇆᜩĂࠎࠤᆃ
͟ώ̈̚Ћຽд઼̚Լࢭฟܐ̝ٸಶซˢ઼̂̚ౙĂҭߏ
൴ण̙֭ึӀĂֽ҃ޢซˢ۞έ៉Ћຽݒ൴णޝрă၆̂
ౙࣶ̍გநͧЇңг͞ౌрĉΞͽᄲѩ̚ಶѣ͛
̼็۞યᗟĂಶѣጏछ؟ڱ؟“Т̙Т߹”۞યᗟĄ
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઼̚ռᒉЋຽ۞ి൴णᄃ็̼͛ѣᙯĂҭߏϤٺ
͟ώഅགྷүࠎֲڌགྷᑻ؈ᖹ۞ቑĂҘ͞˫ߏଂ͟ώăᔹ
઼۞གྷᑻ൴णֽᄮᙊ֭ؠۺጏछ၆Ћຽგந۞։ّᇆᜩ
۞Ăҭߏநྋइϡ઼̙֭̚זԆБዋϡĄ
઼̚үࠎα̂ྺຽ͛ځΟ઼̚˘՟ѣ̚ᕝ൴ण۞઼
छĂᘦ઼ڱ؟۞ؠछԛၗࢦүϡĄ઼҃̚ଂԇฟ
ؕј۞ݭ̈́ࣖڱ؟ݭநఢቑͽ̈́ܜഇ᎕፥ԛј۞࠹ᙯຍ
ᙊĂՀߏ͵ࠧѣ۞Ąԇഈͽ݈ĂপҾߏ࣫ഈ̂؟ڱ؟ݭ
ࣖந៍ྻهүሀёĂϤٺ༊ॡ઼̚ߏ͵ࠧপҾߏ͞ڌ
۞߆ڼăགྷᑻă̼͕͛̚ĂүࠎАซܑ͛۞ځĂ̼͛
Ꮾ۞જତצ۰ிкĂ̼͛ொങ۞ј߿த˵ՀĂ͟ώ
༊ѐ࿅̼̂ࢭາ҃ซˢ༊ॡ۞ன઼छҖЕĂд̂ޝ
ֶߏ˯ޘᏥ၆࣫ഈ͛̂۞ځณொങࠤҌ֓Ą
ҭߏĂϤ̣ٺȈ઼ặࡧใර۞ጼใĂԇഈ઼˧ᘶ
ऴĂ̚ර̼͛үࠎ͵ࠧ͛۞ܑ̝ځгҜ˭ࢫĂ̼͛Ꮾ
۞ਕ˧˵ಶ̂̂˭ࢫĂொങ۞ј߿தТॡ̂̂˭ࢫĄͧт
၆઼̚͵ޢጏጯᇆᜩλ̂۞Ѧ̄ጯᄲĂд็ˢ͟ώ̝ޝޢ
ԣಶዎ͟˞זώ̂ጏఉϠᮕଅͽ̈́͟ώ઼ጯࠁ۞ԲҿĂЯ
ѩѦ̄ጯᄲд͟ώ۞гҜᅈᅈ̙̈́д઼̚۞гҜĄ
Ϥ̚ٺර̼͛۞Ꮾਕ˧̂̂ࢫҲĂЯѩૺྶă˟
ăѦ፸ጱ֭ଯજ۞̈́ࣖڱ؟ݭநఢቑĂ၆͟ώඈ઼
۞ᇆᜩಶ̙ߏ̂ޝĂҭߏд઼̚ݒ፨జஎᅈĄ҃ͷ༊႕
ˢࣧ̚۞ॡĂϤٺҋ̎ώ֗ߏ˘ֶᏥপᝋჯ઼छ
ྻү۞̈ϔĂಶ࿅ኬ̟ૄᆸ؟Հ̂۞߆ڱᝋ˧۞͞
ёĂֽዮૄᆸ߆ᝋĄᇹүࠎ઼̚পѣ۞̈́؟ڱ؟ݭ
ࣖநఢቑ̈́ຍᙊĂಶјࠎ˘઼̚ˠཏវপѣ۞̼͛
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পኳĄώˠᄮࠎĂ̼͛পኳ၆઼̚ٺ၁ன̍ຽ̼֭Ш
̍ޢຽ̼ۤົ൴णĂѣܧ૱ࢦ۞үϡĄ
ԧࣇனд̏གྷ࠻઼̚“ߏ۞זᄦౄ”۞͟ϡ·ݡϋ͵ࠧЧ
г۞ఱߛĄԧ۞˘̓ڈଂ৸ࡗ෴˞˘ಽ̄ගԧĂᔘྒ
ᚹಽ̄ઇޝ႓ܪĂҭߏԧдࢶപ࠻˞࠻ᇾចĂֽࣧᔘߏ
“઼̚ᄦౄ”Ą၁Ă઼̂̚ౙ۞̍ຽ̼̍ޢຽ̼யຽ̏གྷ
่่̙ࢨֱ֤ٺҲԫఙய۞ݡΐ̍Ăдޝкᅳા̏གྷซˢ
͵ࠧ۞АซҖЕĄͧтԧࣇགྷ૱ᓾ۞“ᇅ˘ߐ”Ăࡊԫӣ
ณߏܧ૱۞Ąԧͽ݈дΔִ۞ߐঈ෪͕̍̚үĂ˘
̙̣זѺˠ۞ಏҜĂಶঘ̈́ঈ෪ă̂ঈۏநăࡓγᅌຏă
ზ፟ᄃဦညநăТՎߐᄃᐖͤߐඈ͞ࢬĄ઼̫̚
ѐдზ፟۞̚δநጡ˵ಶߏԧࣇ૱ᄲ۞ CPU ͞ࢬĂ̏
གྷࡎ̂ࢦפĂ၆઼̚ٺϏֽ۞གྷᑻщБă઼֨щБ
ѣܧ૱ࢦ۞ຍཌྷĄ
̝ٙͽЕᓝְֱ၁ĂߏЯࠎԧᄮࠎ઼̚۞̈́؟ݭ
̼͛ڱপኳĂ၆઼̚ٺ၁ன̍ຽ̼֭Ш̍ޢຽ̼ۤົ࿅
ഭĂΞͽயϠࢦ۞ӄଯજ˧Ą
઼̚གྷᑻ˟ܕȈѐ۞ిјܜĂ̏གྷ͔Б۞ᇃھ
ᙯڦĂ˘ֱЋຽგந͞ࢬ۞ࡁտĂ̏གྷଂ̼͛۞֎ޥֽޘ
᪻ᜈ۞ిᆧߏܜӎᄃ઼̚۞̼͛পኳѣᙯĂ̚
Β߁˘ֱҘ͞ጯ۰ॲፂጏछགྷᑻ۞៍ᕇ̶઼ֽ̂̚ژౙ
۞གྷᑻ൴णன෪Ąԧࣇᑕྍޥ᪻Ă઼̂̚ౙ۞̼͛পኳপ
Ҿߏ؟ڱ؟ޥຐ៍هĂߏӎѣӀ઼̚ٺϔிዋᑕ༊̫
Ъ˞̙Тኳ۞൴णᙷ۞ݭᖼតล߱ĉ
ᖎಏ҃֏Ăд̈́؟ڱ؟ݭ៍ࣖهந۞ᇆᜩ˭Ă̚
઼ˠཏវــጾѣͧٺለ࡚ҭߏҲ͟ٺώ۞ะវཌྷĂ
ΞͽдӀৈТШ۞ૄᖂ˯ፋЪ̂̍ຽ࠹၆Հΐᅮ۞ဥវ
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˧ณć҃Ϥؠۺٺਕ˧ăᄮТᚮۋĂТॡጾѣ͟ٺώҲ
ٺለ࡚۞ˠཌྷăّૺĂΞͽ፬ᐽ̍ޢຽ̼ۤົٙ
ࢦෛ۞౹າਕ˧ĄᐌϠய˧ԫఙͪπ۞೩Ăଂ˿г˯
ഫᗓֽă็צ៍هᇆᜩ࠹၆ྵஎ۞гྺϔĂᜈ
ࠎ̍ຽ̼೩ֻຆᆊ౻˧ć҃ᐌିֈ۞̈́ăፋវགྷᑻ˧
ณ۞೩ă͵ࠧ͵ᆊࣃ۞ᇃھତৼĂ઼̚ˠཏវ̚ዋᑕ
̍ޢຽ̼ۤົՐ۞౻˧Ă˵̙ᕝᆧΐĄ
҃ͷĂᐌ઼̚ϔிፋវିצֈͪπ۞೩ĂΒ߁̍
ຽ̼ăݱξ̼۞ԣి൴णĂ઼̚ϔி၆ٺனޥຐ۞ତᛈ
υᆧΐĂᕚ௲ރᝋᑅ۞˭טะវཌྷăՐّૺಶ
јࠎ˘ᔌ๕Ăᇹ၆ٺዋᑕ̍ޢຽ̼ۤົ۞ˠ˾ᇴณυ
ుՎᆧΐĄᇹĂ˘͞ࢬଂ઼̚ିצֈྵޘҲ۞ˠ
ཏߏ઼̚ྺՅݱ͕̚ܧξгડĂົ̙ᕝயϠዋᑕ̍
ຽ̼ۤົ۞̂ณ౻જ˧ćΩ˘͞ࢬдିצֈ۞ྵޘˠ
ཏ͕̈́̚ݱξ̚ົ̙ᕝயϠዋᑕ̍ޢຽ̼ۤົᅮ۞ˠ˧
ྤĂ઼҃̚၆ѩˠ˧ྤౌΞͽ೩ֻྵ̂۞ᇴณĂ
Яѩѣ೩ֻхົۤݭགྷᑻ൴णล߱ٙᅮ۞ˠ˧
ྤĂࠎ઼̚གྷᑻ۞ᜈ൴ण೩ֻˠ˧˯۞͚Ą
Ϥٺྤˠ۞ಏ˘ĂЋຽგந̚۞؟ڱ؟ࣖந៍ه
˘дЋຽЋຽܑ̚னࠎ·̶Ăጱ۞Ӏၑ˵ߏࠎځ
ពĄԧࣇᑕྍ࠻זĂϤٺռᒉЋຽд઼̚གྷᑻ̚۞гҜ
ֽࢦĂგந̼͛˜ߏܳјགྷᑻјಶ۞ࢦјొ
̶ĂЯѩԧࣇᑕྍΐૻ၆ಶ઼̚็̼͛၆Ћຽგந۞ᇆ
ᜩ۞ࡁտĄ
̼͛д˘۞ؠॡߏᅮ“ܛӶ”۞Ăಶߏ˘̼͛পኳ
ਕӎజ˜ؠۺҌଯૣĂᄃֶ̼͛ٙ۞ܢ၁វ۞ტЪ઼
˧পҾߏགྷᑻ၁˧Ăѣܧ૱̷۞ᙯܼĄ࣫ഈ̼̝͛ٙ
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ͽజᄮࠎАซĂ̂ޝ˯ޘдٺ༊ॡ۞઼̚ጾѣͧᙝ઼
छՀк۞ੑಱć઼۞ӖϲጳޘטഅགྷజᇃކھĂޝ
̂ޘд̍۞઼ٺຽ͛ځ౹ౄ˞Հк۞ੑಱć઼࡚̼͛
̝ٙͽਕૉјࠎ༊̫͵ࠧ۞߹̼͛Ă၆̙ߏֶᏥ˟ጼ
ͽ͟ޢৈځព۞ᜦ៌ፖĂ҃д͚ٺᇣፖҖԟ۞ૻ̂
઼˧ć͟ώᇹ˘дֲ߷ҕๅ㔏㔏۞ጼୀ઼Ă̼͛ሗ
߹̝ٙͽᔘਕૉགྷ૱͔ᅳֲ߷Ăߏֶያฯ۞ݓੑ˧Ą
֤ᆃĂߊ͟ώგந̼͛ΞͽЯࠎགྷᑻᓄၷ҃జჍࠎ“͵ࠧ
ௐ˘”Ă༊઼̚གྷᑻᒔ֖ܜ൴णăд༊̫͵ࠧᇃצᙯ۞ڦ
ॡĂԧࣇ՟ѣநϤᘃႷҋ̼֗͛۞னЯ̄Ă˵՟ѣந
Ϥ̙ᄮৌࡁտ઼̼͛̚পኳ၆઼̚ٺ၁னன̼۞᎕ໂү
ϡĄ
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